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ABSTRACT 
 
There are mainly two types of theories explaining banking crisis, emanating from the 
monetarist school respectively institutional economics. Using an allegory, monetarists 
are discussing how much water in terms of liquidity that is needed to stop a fire 
escalating into a disaster, while institutionalists are occupied with the causes of the 
fire. Our study rejects the explanatory value of the monetarist view, but also criticizes 
the Kindleberger-Minsky model for not taking the legalisation and the sanctions in the 
hands of the authorities into account. We consider the institutional factor as a decisive 
part in the understanding of systemic risk and the process towards increasing debt in 
non-financial sectors and introduce the concept institutional clash. Not every 
recession has caused a banking crisis. But all banking crises have been preceded by an 
institutional clash. Consequently, an institutional clash is a prerequisite but not 
sufficient to cause a banking crisis: there must be a recession for a crisis to emerge. 
We also launch a stage-model for the evolution of banking crises. The stages in that 
model highlight decisive factors before, under and after a crisis. Our model has the 
capability to explain the occurrence of crises in a re-regulated economy. However, we 
only give few examples from Nordic banking crises how our model could be applied. 
Thus, the article is explorative. It is natural to make further empirical observation in 
order get a solid theory of driving forces behind banking crisis. The next step would 
be to empirically integrate all the Nordic banking crises between 1850 and 2000 in 
our analysis.  
 
JEL Classifications G21, G32 and N84 
Key words. Banking crisis, finance, institutional theory, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, Scandinavia.  
 3
 
Introduction 
 
The occurrence of about 130 systemic banking crises has been documented on a 
global level throughout the period 1980-2008. As a contrast, no such crises have been 
registered for the preceding 25 years. Reflecting this historical process, academic 
interest in banking crises was almost non-existent in mainstream economics during 
the post-war era. After 1990, however, this mentioned growth in number of banking 
crises has spawned a substantial expansion of research into the causes and 
consequences of financial instability. The crisis related to sub-prime loans in the US 
gives further interest into this type of study. Considerable progress has been done to 
enhance our understanding of the mechanisms setting off banking crises. However, 
the main body of literature related to this research is chiefly focused on depicting the 
proximate causes of banking crises, whilst the fundamental causes are given less 
attention. A major shortcoming in mainstream macroeconomic analysis of financial 
crises is the absence of context and lack of understanding of process. One of the 
participants in the academic discussion on banking crises suggests, quite correctly in 
our opinion: “…whenever crises occur the economics profession tends to come up 
with a new generation model to explain the events, only to find that the next crisis do 
not fit the model.”2 Thus, the economics profession seems to engage in a continual 
chase for a new set of simultaneous macroeconomic variables to explain an outburst 
of a banking crisis, separated from a sequential process through time.  
However, real world crises evolve through time. In our opinion an economic 
historical approach can add new insight to the understanding of both the proximate 
causes of banking, as well as more fundamental factors. On this background we 
present an analytical framework for the exploration and explanation of the evolution 
of Nordic banking crises, 1850-2000. The main research question is what factors give 
rise to large credit losses in many banks that it produces a systemic banking crisis.  
Evidently, structural changes in financial markets precede the instability. Such 
changes are particularly attached to a reduction in entry barriers caused by 
deregulation, financial innovations, new markets and technological advances. This 
leads to intensified competition, credit expansion and increased risk-taking. Increased 
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risk-taking may have several causes, such as poor information for new entrants, a 
breakdown of credit relationships, herd-like behaviour among lenders, and predatory 
pricing to gain increased market shares. Although GDP-growth and interest rates are 
important, financial fragility should be pointed out as a precondition for heightened 
systemic risk.3 Our hypothesis is that even in a strong economic downturn a banking 
crisis is unlikely to develop if the households and the corporate sector are not highly 
geared. Thus, our model has the capability to explain the occurrence of crises in a re-
regulated economy. Whether this holds or not will be explored, when the 
circumstances in the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish banking crises are 
compared and analyzed according to our model.  
 
Theories on banking crises 
The understanding of banking crises has traditionally been divided into two main 
“schools”- the “business cycle school”4 and the monetarist school.5   Whilst the first 
links the development of a banking crisis to the business cycle, the other stresses 
flawed monetary policy. Today, the hegemonic view in mainstream economics 
explains the outburst of banking crises by combining problems created by information 
asymmetry in credit contracts with the occurrence of “macroeconomic shocks” (e.g. 
Mishkin 1991) Thus, the explanation of the causes of banking crises is linked to the 
development of the business cycle. However, traditional monetarist ideas are very 
often mixed with the notion of “macroeconomic shocks”, emphasizing that faulty 
monetary policy both influences the business cycle adversely during the upturn as 
well as during the downturn. This may instigate depositors’ runs on the banks, thus 
threatening financial stability. A macroeconomic study on the Norwegian banking 
crisis 1987-92 suggest that pro-cyclic monetary policy caused both the reckless 
lending during the boom 1983-86 and the loan losses after 1987.6 It has been 
demonstrated, however, that monetary policy hardly could be the main driving force 
behind the excessive boom in Norway 1983-86. Rather the major impulses to the 
boom originated from the deregulatory measures carried out during the liberalization 
of financial markets, 1980-85.7 
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 No doubt that banking crises historically often have been connected to 
depositor runs and bank panics, and the same can be observed in banking crises in 
developing economies even to day, for instance in the banking crises in the Asian 
countries in 1997-98. However, applying bank runs as the main – or  even the only – 
manifestation of banking crises, and failing monetary policy as the major explanatory 
factor in understanding banking crises over time and space, are linked with great 
analytical problems. 
 We consider banking crises as a part of a wider notion of financial crises, 
which can be defined the way Barry Eichengren and Richard Portes do:  
 “A financial crisis is a disturbance to financial markets, associated typically 
with falling asset prices and insolvency among debtors and intermediaries, which 
ramifies through the financial system, disrupting the market’s capacity to allocate 
capital within the economy.”8    
 
We can observe a large number of systemic banking crises throughout history, where 
bank runs obviously were not the main manifestation, and flawed monetary policy not 
the main cause. For instance, several developed countries experienced severe banking 
crises during the 1980s and 1990s without any significant outbreak of bank runs. One 
basic reason for this was the existence of public deposit insurance schemes. The one 
feature being common for all systemic banking crises, however, is widespread credit 
losses and a large amount of non-performing loans, causing the loss of bank capital. 
Banking crises are typically such insolvency crises, or characterized by a combination 
of loan losses and depositor runs. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between 
failures of one or some banking institutions on the one hand, and a systemic banking 
crisis on the other. Bank panics can strike down the whole banking system, and hence 
create a systemic crisis. But since we very well can have the outburst of a system 
wide banking crisis without any depositor runs or banking panics, a systemic crisis 
should be defined otherwise than the outburst of a banking panic. We suggest that a 
systemic banking crisis is defined as a situation when more than half of the banking 
capital or at least a considerable share of the banking capital is lost. 
 
Kindleberger’s stage-model  
The historical economist Charles Kindleberger has developed a stage-model to 
analyse how banking crises evolve through distinct phases, which he terms 
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displacement-boom-mania-revulsion-distress-panic and crash. His analytical 
framework is applied on a vast historical material.9 Kindleberger imported several 
elements into his framework from the macroeconomist Hyman Minsky.10 At the 
outset, the events leading up to a crisis start with a ‘displacement – some exogenous, 
outside shock to the macroeconomic system. Whatever the source of displacement, it 
will alter the economic outlook “by changing profit opportunities in at least one 
important sector of the economy.”11 As a result, both business firms and individuals 
with savings or credit pick up the opportunity, and investment and production rise. 
This stimulates an increased demand for finance. A boom is developed, fed by an 
expansion of bank credit.  
The extension of bank credit increases the money supply and self-exciting 
euphoria develops. An increasing number of firms and households are tempted into 
speculative finance. When the number of firms and households indulging in these 
practices grows large, speculation for profit leads away from normal, rational 
behaviour, and “manias” or “bubbles” result. The term mania emphasises the 
irrationality (mob psychology, herd behaviour) and the term bubble foreshadows the 
bursting.12 Only a small incident is needed to transform the mania into panic, which 
then instigates the crisis and inflicts widespread damage. The problems reverberate 
throughout the financial system, creating financial instability and debt deflation. 
According to Minsky, a financial system naturally evolves from a robust structure to a 
fragile structure. Like Irving Fisher, representatives of the instability hypothesis attach 
great importance to the role of debt in causing financial difficulties. Over periods of 
prolonged prosperity, the economy “transits from financial relations that make for a 
stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system”.13 Thus, the 
financial structure of firms in the non-financial sector shift from hedge to speculative 
and even ‘Ponzi’ finance during a boom. Increased financial fragility is also a result 
of “debt contracted to leverage the acquisition of speculative assets for subsequent 
resale.”14 
Difficulties arise when individuals, firms and banks have insufficient cash 
flow to service their liabilities, and debtors, unable to pay debts when due, may be 
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forced by creditors to liquidate their assets. This leads to a situation with a decline in 
price level and demand. Subsequently, the real value of debt increases and reinforces 
the downturn further. This process of debt-deflation, as Fisher termed it, continues 
until bankruptcies and bank losses have eliminated indebtedness.  
 
Market psychology and speculation 
A core concept in the Kindleberger-Minsky framework is the development of 
increasingly speculative investments during the boom, driven by loose credit 
decisions in the banks and euphoric expectations in the non-bank business sector 
about the future profit-possibilities.  This process produces increasing credit risk in 
the banking sector, and correspondingly an increasingly unmanageable debt in the 
non-financial sector. With high debt-equity ratios, firms are vulnerable to the slightest 
downturn in earnings, since most earnings are committed to paying interest on their 
debts.15 
 When rational expectation and efficient theories are confronted with historical 
evidence, it is revealed that such theories cannot explain the eruption of excess 
volatility in asset prices. Kindleberger’s emphasis of overlending- and overborrowing, 
propelled by euphoria and irrational exuberance, is underpinned by what Robert 
Shiller has denoted “price to price feed-back” theory.16 He argues that when 
speculative prices go up, creating successes for some investors this may “…attract 
public attention, promote word-of-mouth enthusiasm, and heighten expectations for 
further price increases.” (Shiller 2003: 91) History shows that the talk is usually 
associated with “new era” theories and popular models that justify the price 
increases.17 A good recent example is the so-called dot.com.-bubble. Different Ponzi 
schemes, as described by Kindleberger, can be explained the same way. This implies 
that the development of asset prices such as for instance stock prices does not always 
incorporate the best information about fundamental values. Changes in asset prices 
very often happen for no fundamental reason at all; rather they occur because of mass 
psychology.  
 
The Knutsen-Sjögren thesis:  Institutional Clash and Financial Fragility  
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The Minsky-Kindleberger framework provides a helpful framework for analysing past 
crises. The framework emphasizes correctly the role of financial factors in causing 
instability. Highlighting the credit-powered boom, which leaves businesses 
excessively debt-burdened and unable to cope with an economic slowdown, is a key 
to understand the subsequent banking crisis. Over time, governments have 
increasingly used expensive bailouts to curb a Fisher deflation underway. But despite 
such actions, a study European financial history reveals that debt deflationary 
sequences may nevertheless occur.  
The Minsky-Kindleberger theory has, however, an underlying flaw. Not all 
booms ends up in a subsequent banking crisis. Thus, a basic research question is: what 
are the fundamental factors, which spawn a macroeconomic trajectory of a kind that 
give rise to financial bubbles and a subsequent banking crisis?   
In this perspective, it is interesting to observe that the Minsky-Kindleberger 
theory is not very detailed about the role of the state, in the period leading up to 
financial fragility. Apart from acting as a lender of last resort and directing the 
monetary policy (more of less dependent on private actors), the state is also 
responsible for the institutional settings in the financial sector, for example, the bank 
legislation. Thus, it seems that the model has to be developed on this point. Second, 
we need to explain the relationship between institutions and the potential risk of 
financial distress, i.e. the interaction between “rules of the game” and business 
strategies.18 The incentive structure and the attitude towards risk among the financial 
actors reflect partly the content of the legalisation and the sanctions in the hands of 
the authorities, partly the mental setting of the actors. Consequently, the possibility of 
increasing debt is dependent on the public view of risk. Third, traditional theories are 
not able to fully explain banking crisis since the differences within the banking sector 
are neglected. The strategies of individual banks have to be analysed and linked to the 
losses in the following crisis. Increasing indebtedness has to be studied in relation to 
the capital structure of the non-financial firms. By analysing the loan policy from both 
sides and on an organizational level – individual financial and non-financial firms - 
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 The concept of institution includes formal and informal institutions – as rules of the game – but 
also enforcement characteristics. The former is in the financial system represented by bank 
legislation, other legal rules and conventions for financial institutions, habits and customs. The 
latter is found in the directives and sanctions put forward by various authorities and internal 
organizations, such as Finance Inspectorates and trade associations.  
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we are not only able to test the hypothesis of increasing indebtedness in society but 
also link certain bank strategies to long-term performance. 
We stress that a bank's willingness to accept the risk of suffering credit losses 
is dependent on the macroeconomic environment, the legislation and the bank's 
internal governance- and control systems. Losses may thus be caused by managerial 
or operational decisions, a mismatch between old and new institutions, or by a general 
market movement, or more likely, by a combination of the three. This framework 
allows us to explain the simultaneous occurrence of an extensive banking crisis 
generalising across the banking sector, the different performance of individual banks 
during a period of crisis, and even between various organizational units of the same 
bank. We consider the institutional factor as a decisive part in the understanding of 
systemic risk and the process towards increasing debt in non-financial sectors. We are 
introducing the concept of institutional clash, making it possible to understand the 
long-term driving force behind a banking crisis. The argument for using this concept, 
which is defined below, is quite simple. As already mentioned, not every recession 
has caused a banking crisis. But all banking crises have been preceded by an 
institutional clash. Consequently, an institutional clash is a prerequisite but not 
sufficient to cause a banking crisis: there must be a recession for a crisis to emerge.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
Institutional clash, financial fragility, financial distress, systemic risk, banking crisis 
and lender of last resort are the concepts in the analysis of stages before, during and 
after a bank crisis. We define an institutional clash as a substantial shift of the 
dominating macroeconomic policy attached to the financial system. The clash appears 
by two distinct processes – extensive regulatory change and institutional rigidity, 
including the interpretation of the new situation by the actors themselves. Different 
mechanisms are activated, where the most important is increased competition, which 
leads to shrinking margins. In the struggle to increase volume, in order to uphold 
income with same capacity (productivity), control mechanisms are weakened. If the 
credit control in relation to credit management is not adjusted to the new situation, the 
clash will continue to have economic implications.  
It is important to notice that our definition of institutional clash highlights a 
process before the boom-bust period that precedes the banking crisis. This stage has 
not been analysed satisfactorily by others. Our analysis stresses the institutional 
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change that enables debt gearing to appear in the first place, not a final 
macroeconomic shock that overturns the entire system.     
The institutional clash operates in two ways – by co-existence of new and old 
rules of the game and through new business strategies. In the process of for example 
deregulation, the state is not aware of mechanisms between various institutions linked 
to the financial system, and can not, therefore, foresee the consequences of 
liberalizing in one way or another. This leads to a situation in which some institutions 
are lifted while others remain at the same time, and in the new context get another 
meaning. For example, while the restrictions on banks to lend money is lifted, the 
same old tax system that already favoured bank credits will give companies and 
households a further reason to increase their debt. The objectives of the old 
institutions - founded, integrated and natural during the regulated era - will slightly 
change in the emergence of the new financial system.  
By introducing new business strategies, the organizations take advantage of 
the mismatch between new and old institutions. The new profit possibilities emanate 
from the fact that the remaining institutions are making the deregulation much 
stronger than it was meant to be. Profit-based actors respond rationally by expanding 
their affairs, unaware of the risks involved in badly coordinated laws and directives, 
but also stimulated by the indirect support they get from public controlling authorities. 
An inflated boom, fuelled by influx of liquidity, replaces organic economic growth 
based on technological innovations and increased productivity. The state (power of 
control) has difficulty judging whether it is a normal boom or an emerging bubble. 
Thus, certain institutional inertia is not viewed as a problem, not at least for the 
implementation of the liberalisation of the economy. As long as households and firms 
take advantage of deregulation, despite the fact that the increased values are based on 
higher inflation and debts, there are few incentives to be critical. The positive attitude 
of the public extends the period of debt gearing, until the entire financial system is 
filled with systemic risk. Then, the financially fragile situation needs only a small 
shock to convert into a general banking crisis.      
In order to highlight the debt-gearing phase that follows on the institutional 
clash, the term financial fragility is used.19 Financial fragility is defined as a state of 
balance sheets offering heightened vulnerability to default in a wide variety of 
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circumstances. When investors are used to continuous price increases on assets, 
profits are partly generated through the trade in assets. If the increased value is related 
to a substantial credit expansion and does not correspond to increasing variable 
returns, such as rent, a speculative movement is added. At a certain stage the actors 
realise the financial fragility captured in indebted and unprofitable assets – either 
securities or properties. This realism does not necessarily have to be linked to an 
external event, rather a closer look at the books. The financial fragility could be 
studied in terms of levels and changes of indebtedness, on a firm, a sectoral and a 
national level. 
Financial distress indicates a situation of economic uncertainty, either specific 
through realised financial fragility, or general. For a single actor, financial distress 
means that the possibility of doing profitable business has decreased. The firms’ 
income tends to not cover the payments on the loans. From the creditors’ point of 
view, the creditworthiness of the lenders has declined. The financial distress could be 
measured in terms of liquidity balance, solvency, or numbers of bankruptcies. The 
financial distress could also be related to a whole economy, i.e. to the national state, 
and thus be viewed as a sharp decrease of GDP-growth on an aggregate level.20  
The length and the depth of a financial distress are determined by three factors. First, 
it is a matter of whether a lender of last resort steps in or not. Second, the number of 
actors involved is determined for the depth of the distress. Third, behavioural factors 
related to rationality, moral hazard, and collective action has an impact on the general 
outcome. The actors can put more or less trust in the functions of the market. If there 
is consensus about the means and the target, everybody will operate in the same 
direction. This attitude, in turn, leads to a smoother path towards stabilisation. If the 
financial distress still remains, the next stage is banking crisis. 
In the literature, the term systemic risk has been given various meanings. 
Often, systemic risk is used synonymous with ‘instability’ or ‘crisis’.21 In our model, 
a banking crisis follows from a combination of financial fragility in the non-financial 
sectors and excess credit risk in the financial sector, caused by an adverse 
development of institutional factors and macroeconomic disturbance. Systemic risk is 
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 While the institutional clash is the root to financial distress in industrialised countries, the 
financial distress in developing countries are often also related to external event. For example, bad 
harvests force the nation to buy grain and food from other countries, which could lead to a 
financial distress for especially a less developed country. Financial capital has to be taken from 
other parts of the economy to cover the losses in the agriculture sector. 
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something that is built up before a crash and signifies the danger of the system-wide 
contagion of the crisis. The very spread of financial fragility and financial distress 
within the system of finance is thus called systemic risk, and can be defined as 
negative externalities occurring when one actor takes a risk that causes a further risk 
for others in the financial system.22 
The concept of systemic risk is subordinated the concept of financial distress, 
since we do not share the view that the only way to spread financial distress is through 
a bank run, i. e. when the public at large and professional actors withdraw their money 
from the banking system.23 However, financial distress can also be spread through the 
payment system, when banks no longer accept issued certificates or when the 
increased number of bankruptcies leads to cancelled payments. The systemic risk 
appears not only in the interaction of existing institutions and business strategies, i.e. 
in the interpretation of the rules of the game, but also when new and remaining 
institutions do not harmonise with each other. After the crisis, in a country where all 
banks share legislation, we are able to value the consequences of the actors’ market 
behaviour in relation to the opportunities put forward by the general institutional 
settings. The degree of systemic risk could be measured in terms of a substantial 
increase in credit losses and the outburst of a banking crisis is the proof of an attained 
systemic failure.  
How do we define a crisis? First of all, we should separate banking crises from 
currency crises. A sudden movement of the exchange rate and consequently sharp 
change in capital flows characterizes the latter. Banking crises usually originate in or 
induce insolvency in the banking system, and feature a collapse in the asset prices, 
most often in equity, securities, and real estate markets.24  We define a banking crisis 
as an occurrence of instability linked to sharp declines in prices of financial assets, 
defaults by debtors, sharply increased non-performing loans and loan losses, and 
difficulties in the banking system in meeting the demand of its debtors. 
A banking crisis could appear in different ways, either as a panic or a panic 
followed by a crash or the occurrence crash caused by substantial loan losses and 
insolvency. A panic is a sudden apprehension in society of what happens in the 
financial market. This fear starts a rush from illiquid to more liquid assets, which after 
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a time will be reflected in a dramatic decrease in prices, including bankruptcies 
among both financial and non-financial actors. This is the moment of crash.  
Usually, a manifestation of a system-wide banking crisis can be large bailout 
programs and/or a large non-performing loan problem. Such problems can spread 
bank insolvency like wildfire either through the payment system or the interbank 
system. In a situation with depositor insurance and a well performing lender of last 
resort function, this is the most frequent manifestation of a banking crisis. Actually, a 
banking crisis involves a corporate debt problem in the non-financial corporate sector. 
Usually banks do not get into trouble if borrowers can easily service their debts, 
except in situations when solvent banks experience depositor runs. 
The final key concept - lender of last resort - is less complicated than the 
concepts outlined. The function originates not in economic theory, but from praxis 
following the example of operations carried out by the Central Bank of England in the 
18th century. The guarantor of liquidity does not necessarily have to be a Central 
Bank. Throughout history, Treasury Departments and private commercial banks have 
also had a lender of last resort function. The question of the most relevant lending 
actor is linked to the magnitude of the crises. In case of a limited regional or a 
national crisis, it might be sufficient to enlist help from another – more solvent – 
commercial bank. If many or all banks are hit by a crisis, the situation often calls for a 
rescue operation on a national scale, involving the Central Bank. In a case of a deep 
international crisis, or when the Central Bank lacks liquidity, a national state will ask 
for liquidity guarantees from an international fund, today e g the World Bank or the 
IMF. 
In order to stop a panic or ease the consequences of a crash, the lender of last 
resort has two alternatives. It can either intervene or leave the problem for the market 
to solve. In the latter case, the lender of last resort will only make some 
recommendations. If the lender of last resort chooses to intervene, the target is to 
stabilise the economy by strengthening the liquidity base. This could be done in three 
ways: by guaranteeing all debts for one or many banks, or the entire payment system; 
by closing banks and stock exchanges in a so-called bank holiday; or by issuing new 
securities and building up new funds for rescue credits.          
Irrespective of which alternative that will be chosen, problems remain with 
regard to the depth and the length of the rescue operation. Some questions to be 
considered are: How much resources will be spent? To whom will the rescue be 
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given, over what period and under what conditions? In case of substantial losses in the 
bank system, the lender of last resort has to ask what happens if all banks are 
becoming state-owned. A general dilemma for the state is whether the private actors 
will behave differently if they can rely on the lender of last resort to rescue to rescue 
their businesses, in case of failure. This is a problem of moral hazard. An argument 
for using a lender of last resort is that the market actors in a situation of panic and 
crash will not perform in consensus or collectively. Instead, each actor has an even 
stronger incentive than usual to ruin the others. Thus, the situation calls for a third, 
neutral part, to solve the problem by introducing institutions on a general level.25  
 
A Model for the Evolution of Banking Crises 
Since we are interested in the roots of crises, the analysis starts at a point before the 
actual rise of financial fragility takes place. The starting point for our model shows an 
increasing demand for capital within the non-financial sector leading to organizational 
adaptation in the financial sectors, which then starts a process of institutional change 
(see Figure 2).     
 
Figure 2. Stages before, under and after the Banking Crisis. 
 
Stage 1 Increasing demand for financial capital in the non-financial sector, within    
existing institutions  
 
Stage 2 Organizational adaptations within the financial sector, integration of    
resources            
       
Stage 3  Institutional deregulation in combination with institutional inertia 
 (institutional clash), financial innovations (new types of financial 
 organizations) 
 
Stage 4  Idle capital, investments in “false” innovations, speculation in certain 
 (peripheral) economic sectors 
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 To use the state as a lender of last resort has been the praxis in the Nordic countries since the 
financial crisis in the late 1870s. However, this praxis is not limited to only small and open 
economies. During the long crisis for the saving and loan banks in the U S in the 1980s, the states 
operated as a lender of last resort. This has also been the case in Japan and South Asia. In the latter 
case, the IMF also had to be brought in, due to lack of national resources. In the case of Baring´s 
Bank debacle in the early 1990s, however, the Central Bank of England chose not to step in as a 
guarantor. If the crisis is isolated, for example to just one insolvent actor, the state has less 
incentive to step in, unless a bankruptcy of a bank lead to an increase risk of default in the rest of 
the financial system (systemic risk). In order to avoid the “too big to fail” doctrine, and hence 
moral hazard, the potential lender of last resort will rather use the case to prove the risks in 
banking (market discipline). 
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Stage 5  Debt gearing (financial fragility), asset price inflation, peak for financial    
assets/GDP  
 
Stage 6  Price decline, reduced value for financial assets, panic that leads to crash 
 (financial distress, systemic risk) 
 
Stage 7  State intervention/internal reconstruction (lender of last resort), contraction 
  of the financial sector, stricter laws and official control, increased      
internal financing in the non-financial sector 
 
It is presumed that stage 1 leads to stage 2, which leads to stage 3, etc. Stage 7 is 
followed by stage 1, making it a cyclical process. The development is, to some extent, 
predetermined and has a certain direction. As historians, we do of course share the 
view that nothing in history is inevitable. “Determined” means that for an event to 
have happened otherwise, “the antecedent causes would have to be different”.26. The 
first stage consists of increasing demand for financial capital in the non-financial 
sector, leading to higher financial growth. This will turn into a stage of organizational 
change within the financial sector, stage 2. During this stage, the network of financial 
organizations will be more integrated, concentrated, and centralized in order to 
provide better service to the firms. This stage leads to a deregulation process, stage 3, 
whereby organizational changes in the financial system will either be confirmed or 
rejected. The co-existence of new and old rules of the game together with business 
strategies of organizations, given new profit possibilities after the institutional change, 
results in an institutional clash. The deregulation allows for financial innovations to 
be introduced and highly exercise in stage 4. The capital market will be more 
diversified, including new sub-sectors, and an extended risk culture will emerge. 
Capital will be transferred to “false” innovations and peripheral sectors of the 
economy, in a situation of large liquidity surpluses and an absence of long-term 
profitable investments in key economic areas. If the supply of liquidity coincides with 
a strong demand of credit in the real sector, the consequence will be debt gearing and 
financial fragility: the solvency among households and non-financial firms will 
decrease. In case of a speculative boom, the debt accumulation/credit risk is 
concentrated in certain sectors or sub-sectors. Because of the high liquidity rate, asset 
prices in these sectors will sharply increase (asset-price inflation).  
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The most characteristic feature of stages 6 and 7 is financial decline. An 
optimistic period of asset price inflation turns into a period of asset price deflation. 
There are fewer opportunities for non-financial firms to make use of the capital 
market for their investments. The market actors experience financial distress. The 
systematic risk is spread among the financial organizations, and causes a substantial 
decline in financial growth. As a consequence of the banking crisis, the system as a 
whole, and particularly distressed organizations, will have to be rescued by the 
Central Bank and/or the government. The number of actors will decrease, and the 
financial sector will contract, causing a credit crunch. In the aftermath, the non-
financial sector thus will be more dependent on internal financing and financial 
sources outside the traditional financial sector than before.  
 
Empirical analysis 
This empirical analysis on national cases is based on reconstructions of past crises. In 
reconstructing the national cases, we focus three periods of institutional and 
organisational changes due to the actual bank crises. The three periods are the 1850-
1890 featuring the take-off for the modern financial system (period I); 1910 until the 
depression of the 1930s characterized by the abrupt dismantling of the gold standard 
institution at the outset of WW 1 and the attempts to establish a gold-exchange 
standard during the interwar years (period II), and finally the 1980s and 1990s with 
the neo-liberal deregulation of financial markets (period III). Although a systematic 
comparison of all crises in the four Nordic countries is quite possible due to our 
research, we have to restrict the scope of this article to an empirical analysis of one 
country representing each period of crisis.27    
 
Period I - Sweden 
The Swedish banking crisis in the late 1870s followed on a modernization and 
deregulation of the financial system from the 1850s and onwards. Traditionally, 
Swedish commercial banks were private banks with joint responsibility (enskilda 
banker). The first was founded in the 1830s and they operated on a basis of three 
types of financial sources: equity capital, deposits from the public and issuing of 
notes. Since the owners were fully responsible for all commitments in the bank, there 
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was a strong incentive to avoid risky lending. In the 1850s and 1860s, the banking 
system was transformed. Note issuing became less common as financial source, while 
the importance of deposits increased. Stockholm Enskilda Bank, founded in 1856, 
was the pioneer for this type of banking. Next step was the foundation of joint stock 
banks with limited liability, starting with Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget in 1864. 
The legal and ideological support from the state was essential for making 
various new types of commercial banks to important players in the market. 
Confidence was based on a liberal wave, implemented on the financial system by 
radical liberals such as J A Gripenstedt (minister of finance), Mortimer Agardh and 
André Oscar Wallenberg. British and Scottish banking but also Belgian and French 
types of banks inspired them. Later on, the German type of universal banking became 
a prototype for Swedish commercial banks. The development of the banking system 
increased the possibility of commercial banks to take an active part in the 
industrialisation process in Sweden during the second half of the 19th Century. 
However, the liberalisation of the banking system had increased the propensity of 
banking crisis substantially.  
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, as the first modern commercial bank, operated 
with a large volume of deposit. The depositions were mainly based on liquidity 
surpluses from Stockholm-based firms and wealthy private persons. It was short-
termed and therefore highly dependent on the business cycle. Consequently, priority 
was given to short-term and self-liquidating credits. Both private banks, based on 
traditional deposit banking, and joint-stock banks, got a prominent role in the market 
for long-term industrial credit. By extending their function to corporate finance, 
inspired by the universal banking system in Germany, they start to develop a 
symbiotic relationship towards the growing industry.28  
To a certain extent, the increasing number of private banks and joint-stock 
banks was a consequence of a new law for private banks in 1864. The main difference 
from earlier law was the right to establishments outside cities and to establish 
branches in other cities than the head-office was located. The following year (1865), 
eight new private banks were founded. It was indeed a liberal law since it did not 
consist of any rules concerning the activity of the banks, neither any demands on a 
certain level of cash reserves or liquidity ratio. The norm of protecting depositors in 
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case of financial distress had not been developed yet. Instead, the law focused on the 
procedures for establishment and abolishment of a private bank, and the note-issuing 
arrangement. The issuing of notes was closely connected to the note issuing in the 
National Bank of Sweden. However, with a charter 1874 the relation was broken up 
and replaced by a correspondence between the volume of the equity (grundfond) and 
other capital reserves of private bank and the issuing of notes. Together with the 
launching of free interest rate, free establishment of branches and banks and the 
allowance of joint-stock banks, the Swedish financial system had been substantially 
deregulated and more liberal. Furthermore, although the market for industrial credit 
was growing, the increasing number of establishments led to a much sharper 
competition among commercial banks than before.29  
First the private banks (enskilda banker) concentrated on bill discounting and 
short-term lending, financing their operations mainly by cheap bank-note-issuing, a 
privilege conceded by the State. However, the industrial transformation caused a shift 
from short-term to long-term credits. This changing structure of credit demand was a 
strong incitement for banks to gradually insert new activities within their traditional 
banking functions. The underwriting of industrial bond issues for subsequent public 
offer soon became a recognised banking function. The long boom in the railway 
industry in the 1860s and the 1870s, with a peak 1873-74, led to an increase of 
deposits in the banking sector, which caused a surplus of liquidity in that sector. Since 
there were not enough investments and risk capitalists to be supported by credits, the 
banks had to search for other ways to transfer their liquidity. As railway bonds were 
viewed as safe securities, by the banks themselves, the State and by the law, the banks 
made large placement in these bonds. Consequently, in the boom years of the 1870s, 
the volume of industrial and railway bonds in bank portfolios increased dramatically. 
This was a major factor in the ‘railway bond crisis’ of 1878-79, causing substantial 
losses in the banking sector and for the State.30   
The crisis started with the highly indebted railway companies encountering 
problems when revenues from the earlier export of iron ore to England disappeared. 
England had increased its own production and no longer required large imports of 
iron ore. The result was a fall in price and a crisis for assets in Sweden associated with 
iron. Many railways companies were not able to pay interest rate on the bonds issued, 
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whilst at the same time they were holding non-saleable bonds in their own portfolio 
and consequently needed external finance. The bonds fell in value and railroad 
companies and lenders became financially distressed. In the case of Bergslagernas 
Järnvägsaktiebolag, a railway company early hit by the crisis, the state decided to take 
over bonds of value of 6,7 million SEK. However, when the crisis was spread to the 
entire sector, the government declared a principal disinterest in financially support 
distressed railway companies. Since the situation became even worse in 1879 many 
firms were winding up in bankruptcy.31 
The crisis in railway bonds was the immediate cause of the banking crisis, 
while the deregulation of the banking system in the 1860s was the underlying one. 
Many commercial banks experienced substantial losses and the risk of bankruptcy 
was threatening many of them. The worst hit was Stockholms Enskilda Bank, where 
bonds placements amounted to 36 per cent of total financial assets. To avoid a 
collapse of vital parts of the banking system, the Parliament, on the suggestion of the 
Government, established the so-called Railroad Mortgage Fund, where banks were 
able to pledge their unmarketable railroad bonds. The fund was administrated at the 
National Debt Office. The value of the fund was 23 million SEK (1 billion SEK in the 
value of 1993). This corresponded to 8-9 per cent of total public lending by 
commercial banks. However, the actors only needed a third of the rescuing capital, 
where the main part was acquired by Stockholms Enskilda Bank. After the 
intervention by the state, the financial distress successively disappeared from the 
market. The debate in the parliament whether the state should take the role as a lender 
of last resort or not had been extensive, but it was clear ex post that the intervention 
had led to a rapid stabilisation of the financial system.  
The crisis in 1878-79 activated public supervision of the banks´ activities. The 
supervision was organised as a bureau within the department of finance, since 1876. 
With increasing number of commercial banks, the office received further resources. 
After the crisis, the commission was widened to include the possibility of making 
detailed investigations of banks, including their account and commitments. The 
banking crisis also led to stricter laws. Besides, the crisis questioned the 
appropriateness of having commercial banks with right to issue notes. A central bank 
without a monopoly on note issuing had limited capacity to carry out a monetary 
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policy. In a pro-memorial from a banking committee in 1883 it was suggested that the 
note issuing should successively been transferred to the central bank. The Parliament 
gave approval to this in 1887. In 1903 the National Bank of Sweden had full control 
of the note issuing and was formally acting a central bank with a monopoly right on 
note issuing in Sweden.32  
 
Period II - Norway 
The Norwegian economy experienced a cyclical upswing during the early 1910s. 
After a short negative reaction subsequent to the outset of the First World War, the 
upswing soon developed into a striking wartime boom. The stock market soared. 
Speculation, especially in shipping-stocks, but even in stocks related to manufacturing 
industry, became increasingly euphoric. Ship freights went sky-high and rising 
earnings on shipping services caused a large-scale capital inflow. Inflation was 
galloping, increasing production costs immensely. Measured by the wholesale index, 
the price level almost quadrupled over the period 1914-1918, whilst the consumer 
prices tripled. Lax economic policy and excessive bank lending stimulated the boom. 
Actually, bank credit quadrupled over the period 1914- 1920.33 This led to asset price 
inflation, which created a financial bubble built on irrational exuberance about future 
profits, especially in the equity market. The serious banking crisis into which Norway 
ran during the first half of the 1920s, turned out to be the most severe blow to the 
country’s banking system, ever. 
The gold standard was suspended at the outset of the war, like in the other 
Scandinavian countries. New legislation determined that from the 19th of August the 
fee The Bank of Norway had to pay for exceeding their note-issuing ceiling was set to 
2 per cent below the central bank’s discount rate. In fact this gave the Bank of 
Norway carte-blanche to issue money without any restriction, and the central bank’s 
income increased with expansion of the amount of circulating money.34 This change 
in legislation represented a major institutional change, involving a chief disturbance 
of the rules of the game, which had structured economic activity for a long period of 
time. This bolstered expansionist policies and business strategies. Even though the 
monetary policy carried out by authorities after the war was based on a framework 
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permeated by the logic of the gold standard, the system never functioned as it did 
prior to 1914. Thus, the change was of a long-range and profound character. 
After the armistice in November 1918, the wartime boom was provisionally 
terminated, but soon it was transformed to a post-war boom during the spring of 1919. 
A huge pent-up demand had been built up during the war. When the government 
removed most of the restrictions on import, the influx of commodities exploded. A 
new wave of speculation developed, now focused on consumer goods, and fuelled by 
continued bank credit. The current account deteriorated substantially and so did the 
balance of payment as well. The boom peaked in September 1920. Then the post-war 
international crisis hit Norway with a subsequent drop in prices. Export was reduced 
almost 50 per cent in one year, and both consumer spending and investments 
decreased substantially. The deflation was severe and prices fell continuously until 
December 1922. The deflationary development was mainly a reflection of the 
international price movement.35  
Profit evaporated in the business sector, causing a huge increase in non-
performing loans, and the banks’ loan losses surged. A banking crisis entailing several 
provincial banks developed during 1921. Soon, the crisis spread to a number of the 
largest banks too, and some even encountered signs of depositors’ runs. All together 
129 banks disappeared during the crisis. Some went bankrupt, several were taken 
under public administration and liquidated later on, and solvent banks acquired some. 
The greater part of the crisis occurred during the period 1921-1924. Thus, the banking 
crisis was not a consequence of the gold-parity depression, which emerged during 
1926-27, caused by a steeply increased value of the NOK since 1925. Certainly, the 
goal of the newly appointed governor of the Bank of Norway in 1920 was to fix the 
NOK to gold and bring the currency back to its pre-war parity. However, when taking 
the escalating banking crisis into consideration, he redirected the Central Bank policy 
to bank-support in order the rescue faltering banks and thus underpinned production. 
Despite this, however, the banking crisis spread with devastating consequences to the 
banking system. 
Recent research has demonstrated that the boom during First World War 
formed the foundation of the banking crisis of the 1920s.36 Reckless lending increased 
the banks’ credit risks considerably, whilst financial fragility correspondingly 
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enlarged in the corporate sector. When the international slump and subsequent 
deflation reached Norway, the commercial banks encountered an immense non-
performing loan problem. It was dispositions of private actors as well as authorities 
during the war, rather than faulty post-war monetary policy, that was the main reason 
for the banking crisis in the 1920s. 
Especially institutional factors have to be taken into consideration. The 
suspension of the gold standard in 1914 represented a huge institutional shock to the 
economy and the professional actors. This alteration of basic rules in the market 
facilitated credit expansion and contributed heavily to a lax monetary policy. 
Moreover, no banking legislation existed until 1920, and a banking supervisory 
agency was not established until 1924. These institutional conditions contributed 
substantially to the outburst of the crisis as well. 
On the organizational level, the banks expanded considerably in numbers. 
From 1910 to 1920, the number of commercial banks increased with 98 new banks, 
which meant a 96 per cent growth in a decade. Like in Denmark, this happened in an 
unregulated banking sector, and contributed significantly to credit expansion. In 1924, 
the first legislation on commercial banking was passed. This was a direct consequence 
of the severe expansion in number of banks and bank lending prior to 1920, and the 
subsequent crisis. From January 1925, the first public supervisory agency for 
commercial banks was put into operation. 
 
Period III - Finland 
Like in Norway and Sweden, regulations on the financial market were lifted in 
Finland from the early 1980s and onwards. The increased liberalisation started a new 
activity in the banking sector, where banks extended their role on the stock market, 
the real estate market and to operations abroad. Liquidity was imported from abroad. 
In this capital import, bank certificates – an innovation on the Finnish market – played 
a key role. From 1982, banks got the right to issue own certificates to a certain degree. 
Foreign entry was permitted in 1983, thus increasing competition for domestic banks. 
From 1987 there were no restriction on credit volume expansion, which meant no 
relation to the cash reserve of the actual bank and that banks were allowed freely to 
determine the interest rate of loans. The Bank of Finland ceased to issue guidelines in 
credit expansion; money markets were to a large extent created without reserve 
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requirements and the capital movements liberalised by allowing non-financial 
companies to carry out long-term foreign borrowing. 
From the mid-1980s to 1989 the finish economy was booming. The real GDP 
rate went from 3 per cent in 1984 to 5.7 per cent in 1989 and the investment volumes 
gradually increased, peaking in 1989 with 15 per cent compared to previous year (for 
further figures, see appendix). During the boom, the Finnish banks increased their 
lending substantially: the bank lending to the public increased from 191 billion FIM 
in 1986 to 393 billion FIM in 1991, i e with 106 per cent. In relation to GDP, the ratio 
went up from 56 per cent to 106 per cent during the same period of time.37 In the 
search for market share, savings banks were certainly active. In the year when the 
annual increase of lending peaked – 1988 – the average rate among savings banks was 
35 per cent, compared to 31 per cent increase for all banks. Notable, the bank 
profitability in relation to total assets stayed on the same level as before the boom. In 
1989, the growth of lending came to an end, and the prices in related market declined. 
In 1990s, the problems deepened due to the loss of foreign trade after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Also the general weakening of the world economy deteriorated the 
situation for the foreign trade dependent Finland. The Finnish mark had to be 
devaluated, and was later on allowed to float.  
On the organizational level, the SKOPbank and the savings banks became the 
most offensive players in Finnish economic life after the deregulation. The growth of 
lending in the savings bank group was over 140 per cent 1986-90, compared to 80 per 
cent in Kansallis Bank, 70 per cent in the Post office Bank and 55 per cent in the 
Union Bank. Not surprisingly, the proportion of non-performing loans reached the 
highest level in the savings banks sector, over 30 per cent compared to about 20 per 
cent in the other three banks.38     
The trade with bank certificates played a key role in the debt-gearing process 
preceding the crisis. Bank certificates replaced the time-bounded credits and the 
depositions of the Central Bank, in line with the switch towards open market 
operations.39 The value of bank certificates went from nothing to 100 billion Finnish 
Mark, and represented the foremost largest type of funding in the late 1980s. A large 
inter bank market emerged, for the trading of the certificates. The state authorities 
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viewed the certificates as part of the new regulations, not funding. However, since the 
instrument was not non-payable in the Central Bank there was no guarantee in case of 
a bank’s insolvency. In the financial distress 1991, this became obvious, when banks 
refused to redeem other bank’s certificates. The introduction of the certificates 
explains the rapid increase of credit and loans in the Finnish market.40     
An increased debt gearing in the Finnish non-financial sector could be traced 
back to the 1960s. The solidity of industrial companies decreased from over 30 per 
cent to less than 20 per cent between 1960 and 1990.41 The debt gearing was 
extremely high during the boom of the 1980s, when the rate of debt accumulation, 
measured as corporate debt/GDP, increased from 68 to 85 per cent 1988-1991 (Table 
1). In Sweden, the corresponding figures were 152 and 176, also indicating a 
substantial increase. There was no similar trend among households (personal 
debt/GDP) in neither country, which was reflected in the relatively smaller credit 
losses during the following crises.42 
The debt gearing, leading up to the crisis in the 1990s, was made possible 
because of a paradoxical deregulation together with regulatory rigidity. At the same 
time as the market was overflowing with liquidity, the banking law kept the same 
rules regarding credit risks. The rule about cash reserve has already been mentioned. 
Another example is the rule about capital adequacy towards loans and credits in the 
real estate market that remained on the same level despite higher credit risks after the 
liberalisation of the market.  
The regulatory factor should be viewed in the interest of the organizations. 
Many of the decisions made by the state legitimised a development that had already 
taken place in the market. The volume of money traded in opposition with the 
regulation in the money market exceeded from 10 billion to 70 billion Finnish Mark 
from 1980 to 1984.43 The Central Bank found no ways to stop it, but rather approved 
it and made it available for all actors – especially banks – to take part in competition. 
There was certainly a pressure on the state from the organizations themselves to re-
regulate the market. Especially the banks tried to speed up the pace of the reform 
process.  
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The Finnish case gives evidence to the chronological statement in our model, i 
e that strategic decisions on the organizational level preceded the institutional change 
on the level of the national state. By the introduction of bank certificates and the 
international import of capital, the central bank of the savings banks, SKOPbank, 
could offer unlimited funding for their lending. The debt of the individual savings 
banks in SKOPbank increased ten times between 1985 and 1989.44 SKOPbank used 
the financial innovations not only as a way to equalise liquidity imbalances, which 
had been the intention by the state, but also as a way to enlarge the basis of its 
funding. The state and the inspection authority neglected the risks in the balance sheet 
of the banks that emerge as a consequence of the increased debt accumulation. The 
content of the banking law remained the same through the boom.    
The extreme development of the savings banks could be traced back to the 
changing of the 1970 law that removed restriction on savings banks operations and 
enabled them to take on the same credit risks as commercial bank.45 This shift of 
policy paved they way for strategic failures when the liquidity increased in the 1980s. 
In 1985, SKOPbank launched a new aggressive strategy with the ambition to be the 
leading bank in all segments on the Finnish credit market. In relation to the history of 
the bank, being a fairly small and slow-moving Finnish bank with rural-based lending, 
the ambition was remarkable.46 In a questionnaire to CEOs in the saving bank sector, 
the strategic choice and activities of SKOPbank stand out as the main cause behind 
the banking crisis. The growth policy of the savings banks group during the 1980s and 
the high ambition of SKOPbank and the regional banks were also negative factors, 
according to the CEOs.47 
The CEOs in the saving bank sector argued that the most important fact 
contributing to the granting of loans was the offering of securities by the firms as 
collateral. Then came the risk of the planned project and the potential risk of 
bankruptcy of the firm. The two least important factors for the decision-making 
process in the bank, according to the CEOs, were “the confidence in the economic 
policy of the Bank of Finland and the Finnish government” and “the expected 
inflation rate.” Consequently, empirical studies indicate that firm specific factors were 
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far more important than macroeconomic factors for the decision-making process of 
lending within the banking sector.48   
Evidently, the institutional clash appeared in the intersection between the 
intention of the lawmaker, the deregulation process and the lending incentives on the 
organisational level. In the centre of this mismatch between various institutions and 
routines were the tax policy and the rules for capital adequacy (coverage) in the 
banks. Concerning the tax policy and the credit market there was a generous tax 
deductibility of interest payments for households at high marginal tax rates (70 per 
cent). Since bank deposits remained tax exempted while equity continued to be 
disadvantaged in the tax system, the lifting of credit constraints led to a massive stock 
adjustment. Borrowers took advantage of the implicitly subsidies loan market, 
resulting in weighting of loan and equity in the national balance-sheet. Since the 
bank-supervisory resources were inadequate and the staff inexperienced in the 
evaluation of the credit risk emerged, the state was incapable to fully understand the 
potential systemic risk. Besides, the borrowers themselves underestimated the risks on 
foreign-currency and floating-rate loans.49   
Concerning the capital adequacy, the law stipulated 2 per cent for savings 
banks and 4 per cent for commercial banks. The intention of the lawmaker was that a 
smaller capital base in savings banks was compensated by stricter limits on the 
business operations. For example, in the savings bank law of 1969 the shareholding in 
non-financial companies was limited 20 per cent of the share capital of the non-
financial firm. There was no such a restriction for commercial banks. Besides, the 
savings banks law put relatively more emphasis on credit worthiness and risk 
aversion.50 Thus, the scope of savings banks´ operations was more strictly defined 
than that of commercial banks. However, the intention of the lawmaker was not 
followed up by the financial organisations themselves or the state authorities.  
In relation to the legislative reform of 1969 it was sanctioned that depositor 
insurance funds could be counted as additional insurance for banks´ equity capital. 
This change could be viewed as a way to compensate the commercial banks for the 
fact that the legislation allowed savings banks and cooperative banks to operate with 
lower capital adequacy. However, it gave also the savings banks an incentive to 
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increase their volumes, since the capital base had been broadened for every credit 
organisation in the market. “When deregulation got under way in the mid-1980s this 
structural distortion in the legal framework became more pronounced since banks 
could operate with levels of capital that were too low and the rules on capital 
adequacy underestimated the true extent of risk taking.”51     
The acting of the banks determined the normative behaviour of the state 
authorities.52 In case of collaterals, the supervisory authorities adapted their 
interpretations of the law to the practice in the banking sector. The lack of proper 
guidelines on collateral meant that the authorities did not have to ex ante work out 
principles for the interpretation of the rules. Instead, the lending of the banks 
determined the policy and routines of the authorities. Since the savings banks were 
highly aggressive in credit market, spurred by the lower capital adequacy, they also 
formed the collateral policy of the supervisory authority towards the commercial 
banks. Even the interpretations of the courts, concerning both collateral and large 
credit exposures, diverged from the basic premise of the lawmaker.53    
It is clear from the Finnish case that the interpretations of banks and state authorities 
regarding credit policies were not corresponding with the intention of the law. On the 
other hand, some parts of the legislation did not accord with the presumption of the 
lawmaker, which made the provision aimed at preventing risk taking during a boom 
less effective. In 1991, the banking law and the rules of capital adequacy were 
changed, in accordance with BIS, to 8 per cent in capital adequacy for all types of 
banking organizations. In, 1992, a government guarantee fund was set up, with the 
declaration that “the stability of the Finnish banking system would be secured under 
all circumstances.” The SKOPbank, which was overtaken by the Bank of Finland 
already in September 1991, was sold to the fund by the Central Bank, although many 
of the bad loans remained on the Bank of Finland´s balance sheet.54 In an effort to 
ease the burden in the saving bank sector, forty-one banks were merged into a single 
new bank. However, the depth of the recession called for further rescuing operations, 
and in 1993 the sound parts of the single bank were sold to four major banks whilst 
the non-performing assets were transferred to a public company, Arsenal Ltd. The 
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relative share of credit guaranteed by the Bank of Finland in the early 1990s was 11 
per cent of GDP.55  
 
Summary 
There are mainly two types of theories explaining banking crisis, emanating from the 
monetarist school respectively institutional economics. Using an allegory, monetarists 
are discussing how much water in terms of liquidity that is needed to stop a fire 
escalating into a disaster, while institutionalists are occupied with the causes of the 
fire. Consequently, monetarists are focusing macro-economic factors and the role of 
the central bank in building up the imbalances causing the actual systemic crisis. In 
the institutional theory, legal norms and the behaviour of the actors are analysed in 
order to get a grip of long-term driving forces that precede a severe banking crisis. 
Our study rejects the explanatory value of the monetarist view, but also criticizes the 
Kindleberger-Minsky model for not taking the legalisation and the sanctions in the 
hands of the authorities into account. Besides, the Kindleberger-Minsky model is not 
able to explain why certain banks experience financial distress but not others, i.e. the 
variations on the organisational level within the same financial system.  
In this article, we stress that a bank's willingness to accept the risk of suffering 
credit losses is dependent on the macroeconomic environment, the legislation and the 
bank's internal governance- and control systems. Losses may thus be caused by 
managerial or operational decisions, a mismatch between old and new institutions, or 
by a general market movement, or more likely, by a combination of the three. This 
framework allows us to explain the simultaneous occurrence of an extensive banking 
crisis generalising across the banking sector, the different performance of individual 
banks during a period of crisis, and even between various organizational units of the 
same bank. We consider the institutional factor as a decisive part in the understanding 
of systemic risk and the process towards increasing debt in non-financial sectors. To 
operationalize this theory, we are introducing the concept of institutional clash, 
making it possible to understand the long-term driving force behind a banking crisis. 
Not every recession has caused a banking crisis. But all banking crises have been 
preceded by an institutional clash. Consequently, an institutional clash is a 
prerequisite but not sufficient to cause a banking crisis: there must be a recession for a 
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crisis to emerge. We also introduced and defined financial fragility, financial distress, 
systemic risk, banking crisis and lender of last resort. Based on these analytical 
concepts we launch a stage-model for the evolution of banking crises. The six stages 
in that model highlight decisive factors before, under and after a crisis.  
 Our empirical findings suggest the introduction of note-issuing banks and joint 
stock banks with limited liability, that lead to credit policies characterized by 
increased risk, to be the fuel of the institutional clash in the second half of the 19th 
century. The subject for the institutional clash causing the credit fueled booms during 
the WW I and thus creating the outburst of the banking crisis of the 1920s, was the 
sudden dismantling of the Gold standard institution at the outset of the war. This 
created completely new rules of the game in the overall economy, as well as in the 
financial sector. Finland did not experience this institutional change, and interestingly 
this country didn’t experience a devastating banking crisis during the 1920s either. 
The way the deregulation process was carried through in the early 1980s seems to 
have been a fundamental impetus to the severe banking crisis in Finland, Norway and 
Sweden during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The differences in outcome between 
the three neighboring countries and Denmark, which did not experience a 
deregulation of a banking crisis, fit well into this explanatory pattern.  
 This article is in a sense explorative. It is natural to make further empirical 
observation in order get a solid theory of driving forces behind banking crisis. The 
next step would be to empirically integrate all the Nordic banking crises 1850-2000 in 
our analysis. This study will also raise questions of the impact of the “Nordic” 
legalization and culture on the outcome and the frequency of banking crises, for 
example if the fact that there have been many reregulations in the Nordic countries is 
the key factor behind the high frequency of crises and the observed pattern. The next 
step would be to test our model on banking crises in other highly industrialized 
countries in the world, in order to get more observations and make the theory as 
general as possible. Such an international comparative study would also tell us if the 
history of Nordic banking crises is unique or not.     
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